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Abstract. Public-key signature systems can be vulnerable to attack if the
protocols for signi_ng messages allow a cryptanalyst to obtain signatures on
arldr'L'ry messages of tile cryptanalysL's choice. This vulnerability is shown to
ur'i;~(~ frum th0. homomorphic sLructure of public-key systems. A signature
proloeol thill foils the ullack is described.

Gif Ca.i.e,gori:1R and Subject DescriploTS: E.3 [Vata]: Data Encryption - public key
crYfJL(lsysLern::; .

(jwnwu'.1. TeTnJ.: :::::ecurily.
Add:iHonal }wy
lI'o'rds

and PhTuse~;: digital
cryplcgraphic protocol, hashing, homomorphism,

signature,

1. ]·'ormcrly "A Note on StrcnB~hcninB RSA llnd Other Public-Key CryptosysLems",

2.

l~c:;c;jrch

suppo:1.ed in part by NSf' Grant MCSBO-l5<l.EW,

cryptanalysis,

-21. Introduction

George Davida [11 has recently Wlcovered a potentially serious weakness in
the basic prolocol for signing messages llsing the RS1\ public-key cryptosysLem
[10J. Assuming thal a crypLanCllysl can gelD. user Lo sign arbiLrnry messages

Lhat Illny be meaningless. the cryptanalyst can decrypt ciphertext encrypted
Ulldcr Lhe victim's public key or forge the vic Lim's signature an a meaningful

mcssugtl. This is done by getting Lhe victim to sign new messages derived from
Llw inLercepLed ciphertext or chosen message. Although Davida refers to t.he

aLlilck as a "chosen signature" atlack, it is actually a "chosen message" attack
since the cryptanalyst chooses messages Lo be signed rather than signatures Lo
be validaLed. The attack also works with other public-key systems,

The atLack does not break the HSA system in the traditional sense whereby
a cryptanalyst can obtain secret keys, Indeed, Lhe attack is carried out wilhout
knowledge of Lhe victim's private key. In this sense, the attack is much weaker
Lhan a "chosen plaintext" attaek on a conventional cryptosysLem, which, if
sllcce~~;ful,

breaks the system.

Wc uelieve that a signalure pro Local [or public-key syslems developed by
Davies and Pl'iec [ 2] [oils Lhe attack fCJr any

pllblic~key

system. We shall first

dCsc.:l'ibe Lhe weakness in the basic HSA protocol, and then show how it
gc!lt.Tult7.cS La other public-key syslems. We shall then describe the protocol by
Davics and Price.
2. The Busic USA Protocol
l.eL'n be Lhe modulll:l for the vicUm's rWA cl'yptosysLem, where n = pq for

larp;e

~~c.:tTt:l

[,rimes p anti t]; and leL e illld [1 be the public and privr.tLc

exponenLs 1'l'::JpecUvc!y, whet'u e
cp(n)

~

(P-·J)(:l-l).

and

d

arc multiplicative inverses mod

TIle puulic exponent e is llsed Lo encipher and validate
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signatures; the private exponent d to decipher and sign messages. To send the
USE:r a secret message J.f. the sender enciphers M by computing C
the user deciphers the ciphertext.. C by compuLing Cd mod n
Lh~ user signs a message U by computing S ;..; },ld mod

the

si~nature

S by computing Sf! mod n.

=M

= M.

rJ

mod '/1,;

Similarly.

n: the receiver validates

= M. The security of the system rests

011 the assumpLion thaL a cryptanalY5L cannot determine the factors p and g of
n. (~ee

[5] for a tutorial on the number theory behind the RSA system.)

3. Tile Potential W~aknc::m
SUfJpose t,.haL a cryptanalyst has intercepted ciphertext C sent to the

vicLim, where C

= Me

mod n. Davida [1] has shown how the cryptanalyst may be

able Lo cleL81'mine M wlLhout knowing the deciphering exponent d. I-lis lUethod
Vloek:.:; as follows:
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l\lgorilhm 1. Davida's met.hod for obtainina Cd mod n ::: M.
Factor C inlo t::=: 2 components. obtaininp, C::: C t C2 • .. C, (the components

1.

Ci need not be prime or prime powers -- any dccomposltion of C will do).
This implies

that M

also factors into t

corresponding

components

M \..... Ml , where
C::: C t C2 "'Ct ;:: (M1Mz'''Md e modn ::: (JJ,)1l (Jd 2)1l .. , (JJd G modn,

2

andMi

:::

C?modn

Gel

the

viP-tiro

(i::: l, ... ,t).

lo

sign

x

message

a

and

messages

XCI mod n, ... ,XCt mod n. X can be a new message Dr a message preV'i-

Dusly signed by the victim. The messages XC.\, ..
~;omc

,XC" might be lines in

HIe Lhe crypLanalyst requests Lhe vicUm to sign line by line Lo uck-

nowledge ,'eceipt. The signatures obtained are thus:
S ::: X d modn
0'\ ::: (A'Cd d mod n

Compute the multiplicative inverse ::i-I mod n of the signature S, getting

3.

S·--':.: X·
4,

d

mod n ,

Multiply this by each of the 8. to obtain the f,h:
,"'-',<"'( moJn

5,

(i=1. .... I).

::X-ll(X(~)U

luoun::: C:fmodn ::Mi

Compute the product M ,M2"· M, mod 71.

::

M,

The Hllaek can also be made using X ::: 1. Then Lhe cryptanalyst needs only the
l sip,llalures S~ :.: C...rI. mod n ::: Mi. This attack, however, may be easier to detect

sirlce

U1C

[aclors of C and M arc exposed,

In the unlikely evcnllhaL S is not relatively prime to

71.,

S does not have a

lUliquc'inverse mod n. Hut in lhis case, Lhe cryptanalyst can racLor

S will be a multiple ofp or q, whence gcd(S, 71.)::: p or q,

71.

because
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Judy Moore has uncovered an even simpler attack that requires only one
~ignal.llrc:

AlgoriLhm 2. Moore's method [or obtaining c;d mod n ::: M.
1.

Pick an arbitrary S and compute X::: Sa mod n; this implies
S ::: X rl modn .

2.

Gel the vict.im to sibn the message XC mod n, obtaining the signature
S1::: (XC)d mod n .

3.

Compute 5-\ mod n ::: X-d mod n.

4.

Multiply 8-\ by 5. to obtain kI:
S-IS,ffiodn::: X-d(XC)Q:modn::: Cd rnodn =M

Vlldl.::l' the assumption that Lhe RSA system is CT}'PtographicaUy strong
(co'T,puLL\liun~lIyinfc<J.siblc
l'e(~Llirjl1g

to break), Moore's method I:=; optimal in Lhe sense of

the minimal number of signalures from the victim. If it were not, then

we could t1ccrypL ciphertext wiLhout any cooperation from the victim, thereby

Because both algorithms compute Cd mod n, they may also be used to
forge the victim's signature on a message C chosen by the cryptanalyst.
1. Gcncrali:7.ine the Hcsulls to Other
CDmHtlcr'
(sii~nill.i..ll·e)

an arbitrary public-key erypLosysLcm with private deciphering

Lran::;forrnaLion D and public enciphering

We il;iLially

,-t3~Umc

L:t1I~rypl.l0n

(Le..

l.','(IJ(X) = X

Curl

I\'lo(ln~'::;

Publie~l{cy Systems

~ransformation E

= V-I.

Lbe public-l<cy system can be uscd for boLh message

!)(E'(X» = X

can

be

computed)

and

signatures

(Le.,

be compuLed): signa Lure-only systems arc considered later.

meLhod cxLends to Lhe sysLem if the message space forms a group

wiLh binary operator a and identity element 1; the signature space forms a group

·6·
with a binary operator. also denoted by

n,

and identity 1; and the deciphering

LrLl.Tlsl'O{'rnaLion D is a homomorphism from the message group to the signuLure

group; that is, the following properLies hold [or all messages X, Y, and Z:

= (X. Y).Z

1.

b(Y'Z)

0
,.

X~l=l·X=X

(fdentity - for Steps 3 and 4)

3.

X_X- 1 =X-1·X= 1

(Inverses - for Step 3)

4.

D(X' Y)

= D(X). D(Y)

(AssociaLivity - for Step 4)

(Homomorphism - for Step 4)

t\1{'orilhm:J computes D(C) to decrypt C or forge the victim's signature on C:
AlgoriUuTI 3. GcneraHzaLion of Moore's method to obtain D(C).

= E(S);

Pick 5 and compute X

2.

Gel the victim to sign the message X ~ C. The signature is S 1

3.

Compute 8- 1 .

1-.

Compute
S-'.S,

this implies S

= D(X).

1.

;;:;

D(X. C).

=S-'.D(X.C) = S-'.(D(X).D(C))
= S·"(S.D(C)) =(S·"S).D(C)
= I.D(C) = D(C).

The HSA system fiLs this general pattern, where both the message and
signoLurc groups are defined by the integers relath7 ely prime to n together with
Illulliplication. The deciphering Lmnsformation is a homomorphism because
(Xy)d mod n = [(Xli mod n)( y<t mod n)J mod n .

H

i~

not. Sll!,!H'isille LhaL a crypLosyslcm for which the deciphering

transfc·rmotion is

o'l

homomorphism is vulnerable to certain typcs of attack.

HiVC8L, ,~dlcmiln, and Derlouzos [9J showed that such cryptosytems can have
i.nherenL weaknesses.

- ';' We now consider the case where Lhe public-key system is a signature-only
sy~-tCl1l. Thus, the
m8SSUgC

C.

'1'0

cryptanalysL i~ interesLed only in foreing a signature all a

see how Moore's method can be applied in this case, we consider

Lhe individual steps in Algorithm 3.
rnL'3~i1gcs

Step 1 cannot be performed because

cannoL be enciphered in a signature-only sysLem.

BuL since the

objecLive is Lo obLain X and S such that S = D(X), Lhis sLcp can be replaced by
onl~

Lh,kL ooLains Lhe vieLim's sign,lLure on

.:l.

message X picked by the

crypL<AnatysL. SLeps 2 and 3 can be performed wiLhout modification. Step 4 can
be performed a::; long as D is a homomorphism. If D is not a homomorphism but

gis, Lhen a slightly different approach can be taken in Step 4 since the
objccl.ivc is slrnply La find a signature that passes the validation tcsL. Algorithm
4, ',',!liclt gcnerulizes a method by DeMilio and Merritt [4], uses this approach:

!I.lgorHhm 1:. .forge a Signature on C.

1.

Pick X nnd get the vtctirn to return a signature 8 = D (X): this implies

x

= E(8).

= D (X. C).

2.

Get Lhe victim to return the signature 5

3,

Compute 3- 1 .

,~.

Compute the signat'.lie 8 2 = 5- 1 • S l' 52 is a valid signature of C because
N(S,) =

J\'(8~'-8,)

= I':(S-')-A'(8,)

:::: H(S)-I. 8(0'1)
~ X~'.

I

(because g is a homomorphism)

(X • C) = C.

Shamir's signature-only knapsack scheme [11] (see also [5]) fits this
patle:rn.

I-Jere,

/','U'::')::"; SA muu

the
h,

signaLure

where

1'1

validation

LransformaLicn

E

is

given by

i~ a k-bit pl'imc, Jl and S' are inLeger veeLors of

""

long Ltl :~k , and SA denoLes the seali.lr producL. '.... hcre X is ~ integer mod n. The
llW$~:c\[:C

group is defined by the integers mod n with addition and identity 0;
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the signature group by integer vectors or length 2k with vector addition and
idcnLiLy Q. Although

f)

is not a homomorphism,

P;

is a homomorphism from the

signature group Lo Lhe message group, since for all signatures S I and S2:
(5,

+S~)A

modn;:; (SIA modn

+ S?Amodn)modn.

F'or Shamir's 3)'stem, Algorithm '1- becomes the mcLhotl in DeMilla and Merritt

Algorilllm 5. DeMilla's and MerriLL's Method for Forging a Signature S2 on C with

Shamil"s Signature System.
1.

Pick X
SA mod

2.

Ge;:L

and get the victim to return the
11. :::

the

sie;n~~ure

S

such that

X.

victim

to

return

a

signature

51

on

X + C

such

that

SIA moun;:; X+C.

:J.

Compute S-l ::: -8.

-i.

CllmplLL:~

Lhe signature 52

= -8

+ 8\. S:!. is a valid signature of C because

1.:(8 2 ) = R(-S + 51) = (-5' + Sl)A modn

= (-SA

mod

11.

+ S IA mod 11.) mod n

= [-X + (X + C)] mod n

C.

DeMilio ilnd Merritt also consider similar attacks on variants of the RSA
system.
not

'I'hc~e

l'xplicitly

systems all have a underlying homomorphic structure (though
identified

as

such in lheir paper).

which explains

their

vLl1nerubilily to this general method of attack.
b. Al'! !mprO\,·cJ Prolocol
l"or Lhe ..d.Lncks Lo succeed, Lhc cryptanulysl must bc ablc to r,ct the victim
to f'lign essenl.[i.\Uy

arbitn~l'Y mcs~ages

LhaL are supplied by the cryptanalyst and

<Arc nol likely to be meaningful. To protect against such attacks. Users can .3ign

only meaningful messages of their choice. Messages received from other users

- 9~iln

rnodin~cl

bL:

n'c

now

before signing.

describe a

proLocol

that protects

against the

attacks by

Lram;[orming messugcs with a one-way pubHc function h before signing.

A

mcssLlge M is thus signed by computing
S

= D(h(M».

The futlction h should saLisfy four properties:
1.

h

shoultl destroy all homomorphic structure in the underlying public-key

crypLosysLelll; that is, h(Xa Y) to. h(X)-h(Y) must hold.

Moreover, for

almost all X and Y, D(h(X. Y) " D(h(X». D(h(Y» should hold. Then the
cryptanalyst cannot factor oUllhc X or Y in a signature D(h (X
2.

a

Y).

h should be computed over entire messages (rather than on a block by

block basis).

This will make it difficult for a cryptanalyst to obtain

signutures by inserting blocks into u ilIe that otherwise looks legitimate.
3.

h "hould be one-way so that the cryptanalyst cannot obtain a signature on a

message X by requosLing
1·.

il

signature for h -1(X).

"should have the peopcrLy that for any given message X and vulue h(X), it
is computaLionally infeu3ible to tind anothel' message Y such that h (Y) ::::

h(X"). This is needed to prevent forgeries since h(X) can bc computed from
<.l

signatllf'C S = D(h (X) by uppJying the public funcLion E' La S.

acluiLiUlli.1l
itlY0t·SC~, a

b(~ndiL.

Ilec<lu~;e

Lhe

tr'um:formnlions E(-) and D(h(·»

are not

c"ypLanalysL cannol hope to decrypL an intcrcepLed cipherLext

messagc C by

~ctting

a signature on C.

The idea oi Lransforming mc~sagcs before signing is due to Davies and Price
[2], who desigoL!tI

(l

h,1Shjtl!_~ fllncl.loll h

prot0col for signing secret messages using a one-way publie
l.hd conceals me::l::::agcs anti prevents forgeries.

Their
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function h blocks a message M into 56-bit blocks M r, " ... M r and computes a
digesL
M

= h(MJ) = EM~ 0

":M, is l.he

where

"".

0

1JMr

0

E Mr

0

" ."

0

EU1(I).

DI';S enciphering al~oriLhm kcy'_!u Lo block Mi.' 1 is a random G'}-

bi.L iniLiaH:.-:uLion seed fot' the

D~:S,

and

denoLes function compos iLion.

"0"

Dccall:';C: the funcLion h can be computed both forwards and backwards (by using
the deciphering lransformations Du) for an arbitn\ry message M, the messilge
musL be repealed in the keys Lo prevent a "meet in the middle" forgery
(compuLe forwards from J using 2 32 varialions Df the firsL half Df the desired
message and backwards from M using 2:1~ variatiDns of the second half Df the
message; sDrL the resulLs tD find a match, which is likely to occur for "birthday

problcr!l" reasons).
Wolfgang Hitzer has suggested an imprDved hashing functiDn that foils the
med

the middle attack with a single pass over the message.

In

His hashing

funcLion is given by
J.f

= h(M,J) = Zr+l'

where

(1 :s i s r)

Zi+I.= E zj ' Iil M,(Zi.)
2, = I,

Zi con;:;:ists or 56 bits selected from Zi. and

@

denotes exclusive or. The meet in

Lhe middle atLack is prevented because it is not possible to compute backwards
Lhrough the runclion (i.e., compuLc Zi frolll Zi 1_')'
IIe,LIl

I)l':~;-ba~:ed

ha~lljllg

rlllll~UOtl:-::

would

desl.roy

Lhe

llluJLipHciltivc

::l.nlctlli"l! 01' LIlL' I~~_;i\ ~y~:II.'111 and tlw auditivc strucLure of ]tllaps,lek ~ysLcms"

Ulldcl'IYltlg crypLosysLcnl.

Using Lhe hashing function. the message

f,J

is signed as S = D([M, lJ),

~

11 -

where t.he 123~bit block [oM, r] is replicated as many times as necessary to fill
the input block for the signature transformation D.
A signaLure S on all. alleged message fA is validated by first eomputip.g
E(S) = D-l(S) = [ld, 1]; next computing h(M,/) using the public function hand

the ull(.'ged mes::mge M; and [many comparing h(f,fJ) wiLh M. We conjecture,
buL have noL been able Lo prove, LhaL a constant seed f o could be used for all
mcssal:cs wiLhout compromising sceuriLy (in the same way LhaL a constant seed
LS

u~wd

fol'

onC:~Wil'y

enct'yplion of passwords).

Then Lhe signaLure would be

simply S = D(h(M» as suggcsLed ear Her.
The rnessnge M can be Lransmitted either as cleartext (if secrecy is not
needed), as ciphertext encrypted using Lhe receiver's public key, or as
cipherLcxt encrypted using a secret key shared by the sender and receiver (if a
conventional cryptosystem is used for message secrecy, with the

public~key

system reserved for signatures and key exchange).
The haslling function has two important advantages besides protecting
againsL signature aLtacks
1.

1L

separates

the

signature

Lransformation

from

the

Lrunsformation, allowing secrecy Lo implemented wiLh a
~ystem

secrecy
one~key

or to be skipped [2]. Yet the separation is achieved without

much message expansion, since each signature (s a single block.
2.

It conceals messages so thaL signatures can be publicly disclosed

without revealIng their corresponding messages. This is importanL for
reeo\'cring fr011"1 compromises or direct disclosure of private keys. Let
Dil be the signature key oC user A. In order that a signaLure S of A can

rCillain valid afLer DjJ i::; compromised or dcHberately disclosed, S musL
be bound Lo A'<J currenL publlc key

]<,'.1,

limesLamped, and signed by the

public key ~cr\'cr (noLat·y public)

lllJ,

giving a "signature certificate"

,

- 12 -

[6] G

= Dp(T, A, EA , S),

where Dp is the signature key of the public

key Server, and l' is the times Lamp. And ill order that S can remain
valid even if IJp is compromised, G must be kept in a public log.

1"01'

this reason, it is important that S conceal the message signed and
have minimal storage requirements. This is achieved with the hashed
signalure method. (for further discllssion of this, see [6].)

6. Conclusions
Davida's discovery demonstrates the fundamental importance of encryption
protocols.

1L is

not

enough to have

an encryption algorithm

that is

computationally hard to break; the protocols fol' using the algorithm must also
wiLhsL.:md aLLack. We have identified several properties that should be satisfied

by an)' signature proloeol: in particular, it should destroy any bomomorphic
slr'ucLul'e ill lhe llIHlerlying public-key algorilhm,

The signaLure pea local

dcscribt!d her'e appears to satisfy these properties. }o'urLher research along LhE!

lines initiaLed by Dolev and Yao [7] and DeMillo. Lynch, and Merrill [3] is needed
(or' proving the security of protocols,
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